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he  Middle  East  respiratory  syndrome
uzzle:  A  familiar  virus,  a  familiar
isease,  but  some  assembly  still  required
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Aesearch  and  observations  to  date  have  provided
ome of  the  pieces  for  the  Middle  East  respira-
ory syndrome  (MERS)  puzzle,  but  more  are  needed.
ERS-coronavirus  (CoV)  appears  to  be  an  enzootic,
easonal  cause  of  upper  and  lower  respiratory  tract
nfections  in  African  and  Arabian  Peninsula  camels
1].  Camel  trading  may  have  a  role  in  distribut-
ng the  virus  [2,3].  Transmission  of  MERS-CoV  from
amels  to  humans  occurs  rarely  and  transmission
etween humans  is  sporadic  and  inefﬁcient.  MERS-
oV does  not  currently  pose  a  pandemic  threat
espite detection  in  two  dozen  countries.
isease course and the proportion of
atal cases
n  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  where  89%  of  human
ases  have  been  found,  severe  MERS  is notable  for
ts impact  among  older  men  with  comorbid  diseases
ncluding  diabetes  mellitus,  cirrhosis  and  various
ung, renal  and  cardiac  conditions  [4,5].  Among
onﬁrmed cases,  fever,  cough  and  upper  respira-
ory tract  signs  and  symptoms  occur  ﬁrst,  followed
ithin a  week  by  progressive  lower  respiratory
ract distress  and  lymphopaenia  [5].  Patients  often
resent to  a  hospital  with  pneumonia  (or  worse)  and
econdary  bacterial  infections  have  been  reported
5,6].  Disease  can  progress  to  acute  respiratory
istress syndrome  and  multiorgan  system  failure
5].  MERS  has  killed  approximately  40%  of  reported
ases  but  this  is  very  likely  to  be  an  inﬂated  value
7].  No  speciﬁc  antivirals  or  vaccines  exist;  a  range
f therapeutic  options  have  been  tried  with  no  evi-
ence to  date  of  clear  or  consistent  beneﬁt.
b
i
m
a
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jiph.2015.07.001
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ERS-CoV  is  a  relatively  stable  virus  with  an  RNA
enome  of  approximately  30,000  nucleotides.  It
ses dipeptidyl  peptidase  4  as  a  receptor  molecule
nd it  grows  more  rapidly  and  destructively  in  cul-
ure than  SARS-CoV  [3].  Laboratory  conﬁrmation  of
nfection is  routinely  by  RT-PCR  with  lower  respi-
atory tract  samples  conferring  the  best  positivity
ates [5]. Viral  RNA  has  also  been  detected  in  human
nd camel  upper  respiratory  secretions  more  than
 month  after  initial  detection  and  in  human  sera,
rine and  stool  two  weeks  or  more  after  symptom
nset as  well  as  in  camel  faeces  and  rarely  in  house-
old contacts’  throat  swabs  [8—11].
etrospective detection of viral
nfection
he  widespread  seropositivity  of  camels  has  been
ell deﬁned  [3].  Studies  of  health  worker  or  house-
old contacts  of  conﬁrmed  cases,  adult  blood
onors or  children  hospitalized  with  unspeciﬁed
ower respiratory  tract  disease  have  not  reported
eutralizing antibody  to  MERS-CoV  [12—14]. Sim-
larly, human  sera  from  animal  workers  have  not
ontained  neutralizing  antibodies  [13,15]. Here,
ntibody  absence  may  reﬂect  sampling  from  2012
r earlier,  before  MERS-CoV  had  established  itself.
lternatively,  current  serological  assays  may  not
e sufﬁciently  sensitive  to  detect  seroconversion
n mild  and  subclinical  disease,  or  such  cases
ay not  mount  an  immune  response.  However,
 recent  large  study  of sera,  mostly  collected
ud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences.
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after  2012,  successfully  identiﬁed  seroconversions
among 0.15%  of  human  sera  from  six  of  the  King-
dom’s 13  provinces.  Antibodies  were  present  more
frequently  among  those  occupationally  exposed  to
animals, but  often  without  a  remembered  history
of illness  [16]. Given  the  low  proportion,  it is  not
surprising  that  a  much  smaller  number  of  sera
collected in  2014  did  not  show  evidence  of  sero-
conversion  among  camel  herders  and  others  despite
close  camel  contact  [17]. MERS-CoV  RNA  is  shed
from  mild  or  subclinical  infections,  explaining  how
MERS-CoV  transmission  could  side-step  the  camel
and also  why  fewer  than  half  of  human  cases  report
camel contact  [2,18]. The  description  of  a health
worker  who  shed  viral  RNA  from  the  upper  respi-
ratory tract  for  more  than  40  days  without  signs
of disease  further  supports  the  concept  of  occult
spread  [9].
Partial and missing pieces characterize
the  MERS puzzle
Despite  changes  to  healthcare  leadership  over  the
past three,  the  Kingdom  has  continued  to  pub-
licly communicate  deidentiﬁed  case  information.
These data  harbour  gaps,  errors  and  inconsisten-
cies in  need  of  correction,  but  have  generally
been more  useful  than  those  made  public  during
other recent  emerging  viral  outbreaks  includ-
ing inﬂuenza  A(H7N9)  virus  in  China  or  H5N1  in
Egypt.
Well-planned case—control  studies  have  yet  to
be conducted  for  MERS  and,  while  unjustiﬁed  as
a routine  procedure,  PCR-based  testing  of  con-
tacts and  less  severe  community  acute  respiratory
illnesses could  provide  valuable  interim  data  appli-
cable to  any  emerging  and  poorly  understood
human pathogen.  Such  testing  is  currently  not
recommended  in  the  Kingdom,  but  close  moni-
toring and  investigation  of  all  contacts,  including
asymptomatic contacts,  is  a  recommendation  of
the World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  [19]  and
has proven  feasible  elsewhere.  For  a  newly  emer-
gent  virus  which  currently  appears  to  kill  two-ﬁfths
of those  whom  it  infects,  such  additional  testing
may deduce  a  smaller  proportion  of  fatal  cases
and better  determine  the  extent  of  active  yet
mild MERS-CoV  infection  in  the  wider  community
[7].
Not  all  MERS-CoV  infections  lead  to  severe  dis-
ease and  death  but  the  true  proportion  that  have,
remains  unknown.  Human  CoVs  (229E,  OC43,  HKU1,
NL63) may  cause  a  similar  impact  in  the  Kingdom’s
older male  and  comorbid  population  as  may  other
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espiratory  viruses,  yet  the  prevalence  and  impact
f most  non-inﬂuenza  respiratory  viruses  remains
nclear.  More  respiratory  virus  epidemiology  will
etter quantify  the  damage  viruses  cause  to  the
ublic health  of  the  Kingdom,  where  a  portion  of
he male  community  has,  or  is  working  towards
omorbidities of  kidney,  heart  and  lung  disease,
ombined with  obesity.
Animal  model  data  could  be  developed  to
nderstand whether  infectious  MERS-CoV  resides
n droplets  propelled  from  ill  patients.  Also,  the
eal-world  risk  of  self-inoculation  from  contami-
ated hard  surfaces  remains  unquantiﬁed.  Solving
hese mysteries  could  inform  transmission  reduc-
ion. Non-human  primates  could  prove  most  useful
ere, not  only  to  examine  the  infectivity  of  droplets
ut also  that  of  spiked  milk  and  meat  prepara-
ions to  test  the  hypothesis  that  infection  may  occur
fter ingestion.
It is  unknown  whether  mild  or  subclinical  human
ERS  cases  shed  infectious  virus  (they  do  shed  viral
NA), produce  an  antibody  response  or  whether
urrent serological  tools  have  the  sensitivity  to
etect such  a response.  A  suitably  powered,
rospective  cohort  study  recruiting  from  several
rovinces with  previously  high  case  loads  might  be
seful to  capture  the  moment  of  infection,  the  full
pectrum  of  pathology,  viral  shedding,  seroconver-
ion and  to  determine  the  sensitivity  of  available
ssays. Use  of  regular  and  frequent  sampling,  col-
ection of  detailed  clinical  histories,  completion  of
lectronic diaries  and  use  of  RT-PCR  and  serologi-
al testing  would  create  a valuable  puzzle-solving
esource.
More wild,  imported  and  local  farm  animal
esting in  the  Arabian  Peninsula,  and  in  Africa,
ill uncover  whether  animals  apart  from  camels,
uch as  mice,  rats,  birds,  bats  or  baboons,  play
 role  in  harbouring  or  transmitting  MERS-CoV,
nd other  viruses,  to  humans  or  camels.  Should
ther animals  be  involved,  their  environments  may
lso provide  further  insight  into  transmission  and
omplete  the  holistic  ‘One  Health’  approach  to
nderstanding  current  and  future  emerging  viral
hreats.
In 2015,  the  annual  MERS  outbreak  began  ear-
ier and  appears  to  have  been  brought  under
ontrol more  quickly  than  in  previous  years  how-
ver sporadic  cases  and  clusters  often  follow  the
nnual  peak.  The  majority  of  reported  MERS  cases
ccurred  in  association  with  a healthcare  setting
nd health  worker  infections  spike  as  healthcare
enues became  hubs  for  viral  transmission.  It
emains  unclear  if  this  is  where  most  transmission
ccurs, or just  where  the  most  obvious  clinical  out-
omes collect  and  are  observed.  Better  selection
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[he  Middle  East  respiratory  syndrome  puzzle  
nd  implementation  of  tried  and  trusted  infec-
ion prevention  and  control  measures  is  needed  to
educe human-to-human  infections  here  [19].  Such
easures  would  also  reduce  transmission  of  other
espiratory  viruses,  which  are  capable  of  increased
orbidity and  mortality  among  the  Kingdom’s  at-
isk and  hospitalized  populations.
Incomplete  and  missing  pieces  of  the  MERS
uzzle limit  our  understanding  of  how  and  from
here MERS-CoV  spreads.  The  knowledge  gaps  hin-
er strategic  infection  prevention  and  control  and
estrict the  tailoring  of  public  health  messages
eeking to  prevent  exposure  to  infection  by  break-
ng habits  and  generally  reducing  risk.  Finding  the
issing  pieces  will  also  help  deﬁne  how  best  to
lean hospital  surfaces  during  and  after  a  patient’s
tay,  when  trained  health  workers  should  don  pro-
ective equipment  and  what  that  equipment  should
e. The  aim  is  to  reduce  overall  morbidity  and  mor-
ality due  to  respiratory  infections  but  particularly
he seasonal  occurrence  of  MERS-CoV  outbreaks
n hospitals.  The  lack  of  immediacy  exhibited  by
he Kingdom,  from  where  most  cases  have  been
eported,  continues  to  draw  criticism  from  many
evels [20,21].  Three  years  on,  assembly  of  the
uzzle  that  is  MERS  still  requires  the  commitment
o collaborate,  focus,  organize  and  communicate
ffectively, leading  to  outcomes  of  application  and
ction.
unding
o  funding  sources.
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